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Uniform Consumer Credit Code and
National Consumer Act: Some
Objective Comparisons
BENNY L. KASS*
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code- was approved by the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws on
July 30, 1968, and by the American Bar Association on August 7,
1968. Many state legislatures are today actively considering the
measure, with Utah and Oklahoma having already enacted it.
The National Consumer Act 2 was promulgated in 1969 by the Na-
tional Consumer Law Center, an Office of Economic Opportunity
funded project at Boston College Law School. It too, is under ac-
tive consideration around the country.
Both Acts are comprehensive revisions of the hodge-podge of con-
sumer credit state laws that are on the statute books today. In
some respects, the two Acts are similar; in many ways, however,
they differ. Both Acts are quite lengthy and complex, and contain
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many provisions on a number of subjects. The purpose of this ma-
terial is not to examine in detail each section of both Acts, but
rather to highlight the coverage of the two Acts, comparing their
differences where important.
I. GENERAL OBSERvATIoNs
A. DISCLosuRE. The Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act
of 1968, of which part I is Truth in Lending, requires certain basic
disclosures under certain credit conditions. Section 123 of that Act
provides that the Federal Reserve Board should exempt from the
requirements of Chapter 2 of Truth in Lending:
Any class of credit transactions within any State if it determines
that under the law of that State that class of transactions is subject
to requirements substantially similar to those imposed under this
Chapter, and that there is adequate provision for enforcement.
Accordingly, in order to obtain the authorized exemption, the
U.C.C.C. contains disclosure language throughout its sections, lan-
guage which the Federal Reserve Board has already determined to
be "substantially similar" to federal law. Accordingly, on May 5,
1970, the Federal Reserve Board granted the State of Oklahoma-a
Uniform Consumer Credit Code state-a section 123 exemption.
The N.C.A., on the other hand, would incorporate the provisions
of the Federal Act as part of any state statute (N.C.A. § 2.306).
Through this device, the State Administrator created under Article
6 is given enforcement powers within the state even under the Fed-
eral Act.
There are some additional disclosures required under N.C.A.,
however, such as:
(1) disclosure of annual percentage rate and dollar finance
charge must be made in all transactions: the Federal Act exempts
transactions 'where o'Wy a ,tatutory mdnimum charge is,made;
(2) the]'5dqal'Ad
' 
.aridthSC:.C., defIs 61e l y ifth dis-
closure-of credit.cost.'and other terms; ithe.N.C.A., goes beyond this
and deals :with problems" of the, transaction itself. For example,
N.C.A. presribqesj:''h-d.t must .be cbzitained in 'th6 contract itself.
(a)' N.C.A. § 2.302-.r-T uirmirents bf d single writing;
(b) N.C.A. §. 2.303-prohibits signing.in blank..
B. MAXIMUM INTEREST RATES. Neither the U.C.C.C. nor the
N.C.A. fixes rates. Both are designed only to set ceilings on interest
rates, although the N.C.A. does not propose any specific ceilings in
its text.
1. The U.C.C.C. would set the following ceilings on interest
rates:
a. 'revolving chaige accounts-24% per/year to $500; 18%
over $500. (§ 2.207)
b. other consumer credit sales-36% to $300; 21% to $1,000;
or 18% per/year on the unpaid balances of the amount fi-
nanced. (§ 2.201)
c. supervised loans-same as for consumer credit sales
(§ 3.508)
d. other loan finance charges-for all other consumer
loans, the ceiling is set at 18% on the unpaid balance. This
applies to both closed end credit as well as revolving
credit. (§ 3.201)
2. N.C.A. provides three alternatives: a flat rate ceiling, gradu-
ated rates, or graduated or flat rates (as provided in U.C.C.C.). No
position was taken by N.C.A. draftsmen as to what the rate ceiling
should be, and in fact blank spaces are provided. The following
comments were offered, however:
No available data adequately supports the need for the high rates
ceilings proposed in the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, although
such ceilings do exist. in some states. The important matter is that
a state adopt a unified and consistent rate ceiling statute which ap-
plies across the board to all creditors .... This section (N.C.A.
§ 2.201) applies the same rate ceiling or ceilings to all kinds of
credit, whether open-end or otherwise and whether sale or loan
credit. (comment to N.C.A. § 2.201)
C. SALEs VS. LoANs. The U.C.C.C. treats sales transactions and
loan transactions separately. Article 2 covers credit sales, including
home solicitation sales, and Article 3 covers loans. The only ex-
planation for this treatment can be found in the Prefatory Note to
Working Draft No. 6 of the U.C.C.C.:
[Tjhe Committee was and is aware that, sociologically and econom-
ically, sales credit and loan credit are alike and that their separate
treatment results in much duplication in drafting. Nevertheless,
we are mindful of the weight given to Uniform Acts by Courts of
States which have not enacted them. Thus, long before the Uniform
Commercial Code was enacted or even introduced in New York,
the New York Court of Appeals relied in part on a provision of
the Uniform Commercial Code in overruling the Court's prior deci-
sions on privity of contract and determining who may recover upon
a breach of warranty in a sale of goods. The Committee believes
that any encouragement to the Courts of a State which has not
enacted the Uniform Consumer Credit Code to rely on the Code's
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provisions in rejecting the time sale price doctrine would have most
unfortunate social and economic consequences.
The National Consumer Act combines Articles 2 and 3 and treats
them both in N.C.A. Article 2, entitled "Consumer Credit Transac-
tions."
II. LuImTATIONS ON AGREEMENTS AND PRACTICES
Although the language and intent may differ, both the U.C.C.C.
and N.C.A. prohibit some of the most abusive consumer practices,
and restrict many others. A few are highlighted here:
A. PROHIBrrED AGRFEmENTS:
1. Confession of judgment clauses are prohibited by both Acts.
(U.C.C.C. § 2.415; N.C.A. § 2.404).
2. Use of negotiable instruments is prohibited by both Acts.
Significant differences must be noted, however:
a. U.C.C.C. § 2.403 restricts negotiable instruments (other
than checks), and states that a holder ". . . is not in good
faith if he takes a negotiable instrument with notice
that it is issued in violation of this section." The Code
does concede the holder in due course concept, how-
ever, since such instruments can be used in violation of
the Code. The rationale behind this is explained in a
comment following § 2.403:
[I]t is possible that in rare cases second or third takers may
not know of an instrument's consumer origin; in this unusual
situation the policy favoring negotiability is upheld in order
not to cast a cloud over negotiable instruments generally.
b. N.C.A. § 2.405 prohibits the taking of instruments pay-
able "to order or to bearer" in any consumer credit
transaction or consumer lease. Thus, under Article 3
of the Uniform Commercial Code, the negotiability of
such instruments is destroyed.3 It should be noted that
the N.C.A. provisions apply to both sales and loans,
whereas U.C.C.C. applies only to consumer sales.
3. Assignee subject to Defenses. Herein lies perhaps one of the
3. They are, of course, still subject to other provisions of U.C.C.C.
Article 3.
most controversial issues among proponents of both measures.
a. U.C.C.C. (§ 2.404) provides two alternative methods of
attacking this problem:
(1) Alternative A4-the assignee of the rights of a sel-
ler in a consumer sale is subject to all claims and
defenses of the buyer against the seller arising out
of that sale. This section does not apply to sales
Which are "primaiily for an agricultural purpose,"
and limits the assignee's liability to "the amount
owing to the assignee at the time the claim or
defense is asserted."- Furthermore, the rights of
the consumer can only be assprted "as a matter of
defense to or set-off against a claim by the as-
signee."
(2) Alternative B-provides that where a sales con-
tract contains waiver of defenses against assignees,
the assignee must notify the buyer of assignment,
and the buyer then has three months in which to
notify the assignee of any defenses which have
arisen. If he fails to notify, he may Dot assert his
defenses against. the assignee although the buyer
would still be free to raise real defenses arising
after the expiration of the three-month period.
b. N.C.A.-§ 2.406 makes ineffective and unenforceable
agreements of consumers which waive any of their
defenses against assignees. Thus, for all practical pur-
poses the holder in due course doctrine is repealed in
consumer credit transactions.
4. Assignments of earnings is prohibited by both Acts. (U.C.C.C.
§ 2.410, § 3.403; N.C.A. § 2.403). The Code comments that this pro-
hibition is a recognition of the"... potential for hardship for a con-
sumer and his dependents which may result from a disruption of
the steady flow of family income." Thus, both Acts would preclude
a creditor from reaching a debtor's earnings pursuant to an irrevo-
cable wage assignment obtained from the debtor.
5. Waivers, or agreements to forego rights or benefits conferred
by the Consumer Act, are prohibited by both U.C.C.C. (§ 1.107) and
N.C.A. (§.1.106).
4. This section codifies a growing body of decisions in connection with
U.C.C. § 9-206. See, e.g., Unico v. Owens, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405
(1967).
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B. OTHER LIMrrATmONS
1. Balloon payments.
a. U.C.C.C. (§ 2.405, § 3.402) provides that for sales and
loans, if any scheduled payment is more than twice as
large as the average of earlier scheduled payments, the
consumer has the right to refinance the amount of that
payment at the time it is due without penalty. The
terms of the refinancing shall be no less favorable to
the buyer than the terms of the original sale. This
refinancing does not apply to transactions:
(1) primarily for an agricultural purpose;
(2) pursuant to a revolving charge or loan account;
(3) where the payment schedule is adjusted to the
seasonal or irregular income of the buyer.
b. N.C.A. (§ 2.402) prohibits all balloon payments for ir-
regular payment intervals unless they expressly relate
to the consumer's income.
2. Referral Sales. Both Acts prohibit the practice whereby the
consumer-as an inducement to buy-is offered a rebate or discount
for every other prospective purchaser's name given by the con-
sumer. (U.C.C.C. § 2.411; N.C.A. § 2.415). A comment to the
U.C.C.C. states:
The evil this section is aimed at is the raising of expectations in a
buyer of benefits to accrue to him from events which are to occur
in the future.
3. Attorney's fees.
a. The U.C.C.C. provides alternative sections to cover the
problem of who pays the creditor's lawyer (§ 2.413):
(1) Alternative A-prohibits a charge on the consumer
for the payment of attorney's fees. According to
the Code's draftsmen, this section ". . . reflects
a policy decision to follow some small loan acts in
treating this expense, like other collection costs,
as part of the seller's cost of doing business, rather
than a charge to be imposed on the defaulting
buyer."
(2) Alternative B-permits an agreement whereby
the consumer pays reasonable attorney's fees not
in excess of 15 percent of the unpaid debt after
default. According to the Code's draftsmen, this
alternative reflects a policy to treat attorney's
fees ". . . not as part of the seller's general over-
head to be indirectly borne by all his customers
but as a charge to be imposed, at least in part, on
the defaulting buyer who gives rise to the ex-
pense."
b. N.C.A., in § 2.410 prohibits payment by the consumer
of attorney fees, thus reflecting the policy incorporated
in Alternative A, U.C.C.C., § 2.413.
4. Security interest.
a. U.C.C.C. § 2.407 is the applicable section, and governs
the following types of transactions:
(1) sale of goods-a seller may take a security interest
in the goods sold but not in other goods or land
of the buyer unless;
(a) the goods sold become closely connected with
the goods or land in which the security in-
terest is taken, and
(b) in the case of a security interest in land the
debt secured is $1,000 or more, or, in the
case of a security interest in goods the debt
secured is $300 or more.
(2) sale of land-the seller can retain a security in-
terest only in the land sold, and not in other goods
or land of the buyer. This applies only to "con-
sumer credit sales," and (according to § 2.104(2))
a sale of an interest in land in which the finance
charge is 10% or less is not such a sale.
(3) loans-U.C.C.C. § 3.510 prohibits a lender from
contracting for an interest in land as security, if
he makes a supervised loan (i.e., finance charge
exceeds 18%) in which the principle is $1,000 or
less.
b. N.C.A. § 2.416 is the applicable section, and governs the
following types of transactions:
(1) there is a general exemption in that no security,
other than a purchase money security interest,
may be taken for household furnishings, appli-
ances and clothing of the consumer and his de-
pendents.
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(2) sale of goods-a seller may take a security interest
in the goods sold, but not in other goods or land
of the buyer unless;
(a) the goods sold become closely connected with
the goods or land in which the security in-
terest is taken, and
(b) in the case of, a security interest in land, the
obligation secured is $3,000 or more, or, in the
case of a security interest in goods the obliga-
tion secured is $500 or more.
(3) sale of land-the seller can retain a security in-
terest only in the land sold, and not in other goods
or land of the buyer.
(4) loans-N.C.A. § 2.416 (3) prohibits a lender from
securing the obligation:
(a) with an interest in real property where the
amount financed is $3,000 or less, or
(b) with an interest in personal property the fair
market value of which exceeds one and one
half times the amount financed.
IlI. LunTATIoNs ON CREDITORS REmEDIES
A. RESTRICTIONS ON DEFICIENCY JUDGMENTS:
1. U.C.C.C. (§ 5.103) applies to consumer credit sales or goods or
services. Under such sales, if the cash price is $1,000 or less, a seller
who repossesses or voluntarily accepts surrender of goods sold in
which he has a security interest may not obtain a deficiency judg-
ment against the buyer if the proceeds on disposition of the goods
are insufficient to pay the indebtedness and the expenses of the
seller. The seller need not resell the goods. Thus, the Code gives
the seller, in cases of sales of $1,000 or less, the option of either sue-
ing for the unpaid balance or repossessing; he may not do both.
2. N.C.A. (§ 5.211) applies to both secured loans as well as credit
sales. A creditor who repossesses is entitled to a deficiency only if
the unpaid balance at the time of default was $2,000 or more. Thus,
under $2,000, a creditor has an election between repossession and a
suit for deficiency.
B. UNCONSCIONABILITY:
1. U.C.C.C. (§ 5.108, § 6.111)
a. If the court, as a matter of law, finds an agreement or
any clause of an agreement, to have been unconsciona-
ble at the time it was made, the court may refuse to
enforce it or any part of it. The basic test is whether,
in the light of the background and setting of the market,
the commercial needs of the particular trade or case,
and the condition of the particular parties to the con-
tract, the contract or clauses involved are so one-sided
as to be unconscionable under the circumstances exist-
ing at the time of the making of the contract.
b. Section 6.111 gives the Administrator of the Code power
to bring a civil action to restrain a creditor from en-
gaging in fraudulent or unconscionable conduct. Sec-
tion 6.111 (3) sets out guidelines for the Court to apply
in determining whether such conduct exists.
c. The Administrator's powers under § 6.111 covers three
different areas of unconscionable conduct:
(1) unconscionable contract terms;
(2) fraudulent or unconscionable conduct in inducing
consumers to enter into consumer credit transac-
tions; and
(3) fraudulent or unconscionable conduct in the collec-
tion of consumer credit debts.
2. N.C.A. (§ 1.106 (4); § 3.201 (2); § 5.107; § 6.109, and § 7.206).
a. Under the N.C.A., unconscionability is found as a matter
of fact.
b. Whereas the U.C.C.C. provides for either a reformation
or cancellation of a contract where found unconsciona-
ble, N.C.A. permits reformation or cancellation as well
as a provision for actual and punitive damages.
c. Unlike the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C. § 2-302)
which limits the concept of unconscionability to terms
or clauses in the contractual agreement, the N.C.A. in-
cludes any conduct pursuant to a transaction.
IV. CONCLUSION
It was not the objective of this paper to reach a conclusion. Its
sole purpose is to assist those who are considering the enactment of
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consumer credit legislation in understanding some of the highlights
-whether controversial or not. If a conclusion must be drawn, it is
that there is a strong need in most of the states for modern con-
sumer credit legislation. And those considering this legislation
must see to it that their approach is a positive one, so that legisla-
tion can indeed be enacted.
